You want to blame capitalism for an accident at a nuclear power plant in Japan? When its the government that decides nuclear energy policy?
Recent energy policy: Focus on nuclear
Japan's energy policy has been driven by considerations of energy security and the need to minimise dependence on current imports. The main elements regarding nuclear power are:
* continue to have nuclear power as a major element of electricity production.
* recycle uranium and plutonium from used fuel, initially in LWRs, and have reprocessing domestically from 2005.
* steadily develop fast breeder reactors in order to improve uranium utilisation dramatically.
* promote nuclear energy to the public, emphasising safety and non-proliferation.
In March 2002 the Japanese government announced that it would rely heavily on nuclear energy to achieve greenhouse gas emission reduction goals set by the Kyoto Protocol. A 10-year energy plan, submitted in July 2001 to the Minister of Economy Trade & Industry (METI), was endorsed by cabinet. It called for an increase in nuclear power generation by about 30 percent (13,000 MWe), with the expectation that utilities would have 9 to 12 new nuclear plants operating by 2011.
At present Japan has 54 reactors totalling 46,102 MWe (net) on line, with two (2756 MWe) under construction and 12 (16,532 MWe) planned. In 2010 the first of those now operating reached their 40-year mark, at which stage some may close down. However, JAPC obtained approval for its small Tsuruga unit 1 to continue to 2016, due to 2 x 1538 MWe new capacity at that site being delayed. Then Kansai applied for a 10-year licence extension from November 2010 for its Mihama-1. NISA approved Kansai's long-term maintenance and management policy for the unit and granted a life extension accordingly, which was then agreed by local government.
In June 2002, a new Energy Policy Law set out the basic principles of energy security and stable supply, giving greater authority to the government in establishing the energy infrastructure for economic growth. It also promoted greater efficiency in consumption, a further move away from dependence on fossil fuels, and market liberalisation.
In November 2002, the Japanese government announced that it would introduce a tax on coal for the first time, alongside those on oil, gas and LPG in METI's special energy account, to give a total net tax increase of some JPY 10 billion from October 2003. At the same time METI would reduce its power-source development tax, including that applying to nuclear generation, by 15.7% - amounting to JPY 50 billion per year. While the taxes in the special energy account were originally designed to improve Japan's energy supply mix, the change is part of the first phase of addressing Kyoto goals by reducing carbon emissions. The second phase, planned for 2005-07, was to involve a more comprehensive environmental tax system, including a carbon tax.
These developments, despite some scandal in 2002 connected with records of equipment inspections at nuclear power plants, paved the way for an increased role for nuclear energy.
In 2004 Japan's Atomic Industrial Forum released a report on the future prospects for nuclear power in the country. It brought together a number of considerations including 60% reduction in carbon dioxide emissions and 20% population reduction but with constant GDP. Projected nuclear generating capacity in 2050 was 90 GWe. This means doubling both nuclear generating capacity and nuclear share to about 60% of total power produced. In addition, some 20 GW (thermal) of nuclear heat will be utilised for hydrogen production. Hydrogen is expected to supply 10% of consumed energy and 70% of this will come from nuclear plants.
In July 2005 the Atomic Energy Commission reaffirmed policy directions for nuclear power in Japan, while confirming that the immediate focus would be on LWRs. The main elements are that a "30-40% share or more" shall be the target for nuclear power in total generation after 2030, including replacement of current plants with advanced light water reactors. Fast breeder reactors will be introduced commercially, but not until about 2050. Used fuel will be reprocessed domestically to recover fissile material for use in MOX fuel. Disposal of high-level wastes will be addressed after 2010.
In April 2006 the Institute of Energy Economics Japan forecast for 2030 that while primary energy demand will decrease 10%, electricity use will increase and nuclear share will be 41%, from 63 GWe of capacity. Ten new units would come on line by 2030 and Tsuruga-1 would be retired.
In May 2006 the ruling Liberal Democratic Party urged the government to accelerate development of fast breeder reactors (FBRs), calling this "a basic national technology". It proposed increased budget, better coordination in moving from R&D to verification and implementation, plus international cooperation. Japan is already playing a leading role in the Generation IV initiative, with focus on sodium-cooled FBRs, though the 280 MWe (gross) Monju prototype FBR remained shut down until May 2010.
In April 2007 the government selected Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) as the core company to develop a new generation of FBRs. This was backed by government ministries, the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) and the Federation of Electric Power Companies of Japan. These are concerned to accelerate the development of a world-leading FBR by Japan. MHI has been actively engaged in FBR development since the 1960s as a significant part of its nuclear power business.
METI's 2010 electricity supply plan shows nuclear capacity growing by 12.94 GWe by 2019, and the share of supply growing from 2007's depressed 262 TWh (25.4%) to about 455 TWh (41%) in 2019.
We still have a lot to learn about how bad the explosion and radiation release was, anyway, so you are rushing to judgment.
As for geothermal, it requires the drilling of shafts which often emit sulfur fumes. No form of energy is entirely safe, and you are wrong about the zero waste. I doubt much of what you know about geothermal energy is correct.