The astronaut who recruited me for the climbing expedition missed being on Columbia's last flight by just one mission.  He was the Payload Commander on the last safe mission of Columbia, one year before the disaster.  He invited me to see him launch from a special area at the Cape for astronaut-invited family and friends only, and I did.  Awesome to watch.

We're doing the 3-week expedition to climb Denali next May-June.  The other astronaut, who I haven't met yet, has been tasked with participating in the effort to develop a protocol for astronauts to do EVAs to examine the shuttle for damage, and even do some minor repairs of the leading edge and tile replacement.  In my view, however, this project is being done mostly to placate Congress, and is not likely to change the outcome of a catastrophic failure as was experienced last year.

The real underlying cause of the Columbia disaster was a mindset at NASA in which line engineers felt excessive pressure to not "rock the boat" by bringing up safety concerns.  This is a byproduct of a "can do" culture in which the meeting of project milestones takes precedence over safety.

The astronauts I have talked with do not want to die for stupid reasons, but they also understand that space travel is inherently dangerous, and they accept that risk.

There will be two other non-astronaut NASA guys also on the Denali expedition in May-JUne, and it will be interesting to get their perspective.

It's very sad to see what's become of NASA, and how willing they've been to jeopardize the shuttle crews under the mantle of "cheaper, better, faster". Yes, with the new, improved, NASA, you can do all three simultaneously.

I find it somewhat disingenuous for the flight director, Paul Hill, to claim that "...The most complicated machine ever built got knocked out of the sky by a pound and a half of foam. I don't know how any of us could have seen that coming...." Having observed the impact of foam during lift-off, at least one mid-level engineer was desperately recommending satellite imaging of the shuttle wings to assess the damage, with management paying him no heed. This is very reminiscent of the O-ring problems with the Challenger disaster, in which concerns of worried engineers were ignored.

Even before the loss of the Columbia, NASA was using the 4th shuttle as spare parts to keep the remaining three flying. Now they've lost their only major source of spare parts; much of the shuttle equipment is no longer being made, with even the OEM manufacturing firms having gone out of business. Given the abysmal maintenance performed on these shuttles, future disasters are almost inevitable.

Possibly the only legitimate mission for the remaining shuttle fleet might be to repair the Hubble Space Telescope -- but even that great scientific instrument is being sacrificed for political expediency.